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With the increased emphasis that has been given to patient
autonomy in recent years, it is not surprising that the question should
arise as to whether any right to refuse medical treatment extends to
incompetent patients and if so, how such a right should be exercised.
Indeed, these issues are raised by Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz,l a Massachusetts court decision that has attracted a good
deal of attention in recent months.
The Saikewicz Decision: An Overview
On April 19, 1976 , Joseph Saikewicz, a 67-year-old mentally
retarded person with an LQ. of 10 and a mental age of approximately
two years and eight months, was diagnosed as suffering from acute
myeloblastic monocytic leukemia. Although the disease is invariably
fatal , chemotherapy offered a 30-50 percent chance of a temporary
remission; such remissions typically last between two and thirteen
months, although longer periods of remission are possible. A usual
feature of the chemotherapy is the presence of adverse side effects
such as severe nausea, bladder irritation , numbness and tingling of the
extremities, and loss of hair. Because the cooperation of the patient
over several weeks of time is crucial for chemotherapy and because
Joseph Saikewicz, due to his mental retardation, could not be assumed
to be cooperative, it was anticipated that it might be necessary to
restrain him for extended periods of time if chemotherapy were to be
administered.
The superintendent and staff attorney of the Belchertown State
School where Saikewicz resided, filed a motion in the probate court
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for the immediate appointment of a guardian ad litem with authority
to make the necessary decisions concerning the care and treatment of
Saikewicz. The probate judge appointed a guardian ad litem on May 5,
1976. This guardian, supported by the attending physicians, recommended non-treatment. The probate court entered an order permitting
non-treatment and immediately appealed the decision. On July 9,
1976, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the probate
court's order and indicated that an opinion would be issued at a later
date. On Sept. 4, 1976, Joseph Saikewicz died (according to the court
record, without pain or discomfort). The opinion was delivered Nov.
28,1977 .
Of particular interest in the Saikewicz decision is the use of the
"substituted judgment" standard which, the court asserted, "commends itself simply because of its straightforward respect for the
integrity and autonomy of the individual."2 In reaching its decision,
the court argued (a) that in appropriate circumstances, there is a general right to refuse medical treatment for a terminal illness, and
(b) that "the substantive rights of the competent and the incompetent
person are the same in regard to the right to decline potentially lifeprolonging treatment.3 The substituted judgment approach is identified as the means of exercising the right of the incompetent patient to
refuse medical treatment. In applying the substituted judgment standard, the court insisted that "statistical factors indicating that a majority of competent persons similarly situated choose treatment" do not
indicate what an individual choice in a particular situation might be. 4
Thus, the court attempted to determine what Joseph Saikewicz himself would have wanted ·in the situation had he been able to make a
decision and express himself. After considering various factors, the
court concluded "that the decision to withhold treatment from Saikewicz was based on a regard for his actual interests and preferences and
that the facts supported this decision. "5
Saikewicz and the Substituted Judgment Standard
Is the use of the substituted judgment standard appropriate in a
case such as this one? I shall argue that it is not, for the following
reasons : 1) the notion of a right to refuse presupposes a decisionmaking capacity that cannot be said to have existed in this situation,
2) the nature of autonomy is such that it cannot be assumed by someone else (or by a court) without express authorization by the person
whose autonomy it is, and 3) attempting to ascribe preferences to
others apart from any expression of them is tricky business that places
one on very treacherous grounds.
One of the problems that surrounds the use of the language of
rights in many discussions, including that of the court in the Saikewicz
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decision, is the failure to distinguish various types of rights. For
example, sometimes the language of rights is used to designate some
sort of a guaranteed option, as when it is asserted that someone has a
right to vote. A second type of right, which is also negative in nature,
is reflected in proscriptions of such things as killing and stealing; the
basic notion here is that certain things ought to be declared out of
bounds to others in society. Thus, whether the claim refers to life,
property or some other consideration, this type of right involves the
assertion that whatever is specified is to be reserved for the person
who possesses the right. A third type of right suggests that the person
who has the right has a legitimate claim to something, e.g., healthy
working conditions or a minimum standard of living . In this case, the
accompanying notion of obligation is that someone, such as an
employer or society as a whole, has an obligation to provide whatever
is specified in the statement of rights. 6
The assertion that there is a right to refuse medical treatment is
most coherently interpreted as a claim that involves the first type of
right - that of a right as a guaranteed option. The problem insofar as
the Saikewicz case is concerned is that this type of right, unlike the
other two, presupposes the existence of an agent capable of making
decisions. Moreover, as is illustrated by the example of voting rights, it
is usual to suggest, particularly when the stakes are high, that the
presence of a well-developed decision-making capacity is a precondition for the exercise of the right (hence the identification of a
minimum age for voting). In short, to say that someone ought to be
guaranteed an option doesn't make much sense if that someone is not
capable, and never will be capable, of making decisions at a level
commensurate with that required for the exercise of the right. As Paul
Ramsey observes, " Incompetent patients do not have 'privacy' in the
sense of autonomy and self-determination. Competent patients do." 7
At best, to assert that the incompetent patient has a right to choose is
to make a hollow statement. At worst, to so claim is to invite abuse.
In all cases, it is to add confusion to the situation.
Violation of Notion of Autonomy
Second, even if the refusal of medical treatment could be said to
have been an option for Joseph Saikewicz, to attempt to exercise that
option for him, as the court did, does violence to the notion of autonomy. As is illustrated by the provision added to the New York Mental
Hygiene Law in 1966, enabling the designation of a Committee of the
Person to act on one 's behalf should one become incompetent,S it
might be possible to delegate autonomy, or at least the right to make
decisions justified by appeals to autonomy. And in cases in which
patients have expressed treatment preferences prior to becoming
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incompetent, it might be the case that autonomy can be respected
retrospectively. However, if autonomy is understood as making the
decisions relevant to one's own affairs, it is difficult to see how the
decision-making process can simply be assumed by someone else without undercutting the very notion of autonomy; quite obviously, if
someone else is making the decisions, particularly without express
authorization by the person to whom the decisions relate, that person
is not in control of his or her own affairs. Thus, contrary to what the
court asserted, the substituted judgment standard, as it was applied in
this case, cannot appropriately be characterized as respecting the
autonomy of Joseph Saikewicz, but rather would seem to stand in
contradiction to the notion of patient autonomy.

(

Third, in cases such as that of Joseph Saikewicz in wh ich no expression of preference has been made or can be made by the patient, can
we with confidence determine what the preference of a particular
patient might be? In discussing the principle of paternalism, John
Rawls asserts, "We must choose for others as we have reason to believe
they would choose for themselves if they were at the age of reason
and deciding rationally."9 But however fine that might sound in
theory, in practice is such possible?
The court showed wisdom in not basing its decision on statistical
studies of the population as a whole or on the projected preferences of
competent persons imagining what they would do in similar situations;
rather, as noted above, the court attempted to determine what Joseph
Saikewicz himself would have wanted, had he been able to make a
decision and express himself. But was there any way of determining
this? Granted, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the pain and
discomfort accompanying the chemotherapy would have been considerable. But how would he have felt about things in the periods of
calm between the storms? As the attorney general of Massachusetts
noted in commenting on the case, "There is no way for us to know if
this mentally retarded person 'fears' or 'understands' the pain; and
there is no way for us to measure his desire to live or his appreciation
of being alive. "10 In short, to attempt to ascribe preferences to others
is very tricky business in situations in which the patient has not
expressed and cannot express a preference. Thus one must seriously
question whether responses to situations such as that of Joseph Saikewicz should be based on such uncertain grounds.
The upshot of all of this is that the substituted judgment approach
does not seem to be a particularly appropriate way of deciding what
ought to be done in situations involving incompetent patients who
have not had occasion previously to express treatment preferences.
This is not to suggest that incompetent patients don't have any rights;
indeed, I insist emphatically that quite the opposite is the case and
that the personhood of incompetent patients ought to be defended just
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as rigorously as the personhood of competent patients. Rather, it is to
protest attempting to justify treatment decisions by making appeals to
autonomy when so doing is incongruous and to suggest that we would
be well advised to use other concepts of rights and other moral norms
when responding to situations such as that of Joseph Saikewicz.
Concluding Considerations
It should be noted that the critique presented in the preceding
paragraphs has focused on the appropriateness of the substituted judgment standard in this particular case, not on the question of treatment
versus non-treatment. To argue that the use of the substituted judgment standard is inappropriate does not automatically lead to the
conclusion that treatment is the only defensible course of action. It
might be possible to argue (a) that priority ought to be given to maintaining quality of life in situations in which treatment intended to
prolong life would be· exceedingly burdensome, (b) that compassion
mandates that certain terminally-ill patients be allowed to die peacefully rather than be subjected to intrusive forms of treatment of questionable value, or (c) that society's obligation to provide medical treatment is not unlimited and that providing for chemotherapy in the case
of Joseph Saikewicz would have been beyond the call of duty. But if
any or all of these arguments are to be made, the issues that they
address ought to be addressed head-on. Cloaking non-treatment decisions in language that does not fit the occasion obscures the real issues
that underlie many such decisions.
Finally, in criticizing the use of the substituted judgment standard
in the Saikewicz decision , I do not wish to imply that the expressed
preferences of previously-competent patients should not be taken into
consideration when making treatment decision. It is surely not
unusual or absurd to suggest that the preferences of a person should
be respected even in situations in which the person is no longer able to
give active expression to them. When there is a track record clearly
indicating treatment preferences, a strong case can be made for giving
recognition to previously expressed preferences of an incompetent
patient. Situations where such might be appropriate could include cases
in which there is a recently affirmed living will and cases in which
treatment refusal options such as that provided by the California
Natural Death Act have been exercised.
In summary , to speak of a right of refusal when no capacity for
choice has ever existed, to make decisions in the name of autonomy
when no authorization to do so has been extended by the patient, and
to ascribe preferences to a patient when there is no track record on
which to base these preferences is to over-extend the notion of patient
autonomy and the accompanying notion of the right to refuse medical
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treatment. To misuse a conceptual framework that has come to play
an important role in discussions of medical ethics can only damage the
cause of patients' rights. The irony of Saikewicz is that it undercuts
the very values which it purports to affirm. 11
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